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the Right ChoiceIntroduction
Harvard Business Review, the marquee publication of Har-
vard Business School, recently came up with the following
advertisement (dated December 27, 2012)1Why do smart and experienced managers keep believing they
have made the right choice, even when negative results are
staring them in the face? This specially-priced collection
will help people at all levels understand the fundamental
practices of effective decision making and negotiation
skills so they can make better choices in both their
professional and personal lives.
on by the author at Center of
January 3, 2013. The author
ul comments on the earlier
m
ian Institute of Management
anagement Bangalore. Productio
3.07.005It is clear from the above illustration that better deci-
sion making continues to remain an important topic in both
academia and the contemporary business world. This is due
mainly to the lasting impact a decision has on a person’s
professional and personal life. The topic of decision making
falls under the broad topic of executive functions, which is
an umbrella term for cognitive processes that regulate,
control, and manage other cognitive processes. Thesen and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
204 S. Swamiinclude planning, working memory, attention, problem
solving, verbal reasoning, inhibition, mental flexibility,
multi-tasking, and initiation and monitoring of actions
(Chan, Shum, Toulopoulou, & Chen, 2008; Elliott, 2003).
Our major objective in this paper is to provide a broad
overview of the area of decision making as a component of
executive functions. Although past studies have addressed
the topic of decision making by tracing its history and various
issues (refer Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006; Hammond,
Keeney, & Raiffa, 2006, pp. 1e9), in the current paper, we
depart from the extant literature in the following important
ways. First, we adopt a more holistic approach in addressing
this topic. Accordingly, we include in our review, theories
and concepts from the fields of psychology, behavioural
economics, operations research, and managerial practice.
Also, past studies in managerial decision making have not
provided as explicit a linkage with the important area of
executive functions as we have in this paper.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the
next section we provide a brief overview of executive
functions. We then provide a definitional view of decision
making. The important theories of decision making are
covered in the fourth section. The fifth section discusses
cognitive biases, systematic errors, and the use of heu-
ristics in decision making. Some practice-oriented aspects
of executive decision making are covered in the sixth
section. An illustrative case of complex and realistic de-
cision making is presented in the seventh section. We
conclude in the eighth section with some specific
observations.Executive functions
Executive functions are basically the management system
of the brain. Impairments in executive functions, which are
thought to involve the frontal lobes of the brain (Julie &
Emory, 2006), can have a major impact on one’s ability to
perform such tasks as planning, prioritising, organising,
paying attention to and remembering details, controlling
emotional reactions, and decision making.
The best way to explain the role of executive functions
is that it is similar to a conductor’s role within an or-
chestra. The conductor manages, directs, organises and
integrates each member of the orchestra. He cues each
musician, so they know when to begin to play, how fast or
slowly to play, how loudly or softly to play and when to
stop playing. Without the conductor, the music would not
flow as smoothly or sound as beautiful (Low, 2009).
People use executive functions to perform activities
such as planning, organising, strategising, paying attention
to and remembering details, and managing time and space.
The following general components of executive functions
have been outlined by Dendy (2002):
- Working memory and recall e holding facts in mind while
manipulating information; accessing facts stored in long-
term memory
- Activation, arousal, and effort e getting started, paying
attention, finishing work
- Controlling emotions e ability to tolerate frustration,
thinking before acting or speaking- Internalising language e using “self-talk” to control one’s
behaviour and direct future actions
- Taking an issue apart, analysing the pieces, reconstituting
and organising the pieces into new ideas e complex
problem solving
- Shifting, inhibiting e changing activities, stopping exist-
ing activity, stopping and thinking before acting or
speaking
- Organising/planning ahead e organising time, projects,
materials, and possessions;
- Monitoring e controlling and prompting
It is clear from the above list that the executive skill of
decision making is closely related to the above
components.What is decision making?
Decision making refers to the mental (or cognitive)
process of selecting a logical choice from the available
options. In other words, it implies assessing and
choosing among several competing alternatives. When
trying to make a good decision, a person must weigh the
positives and negatives of each option, and consider all
the alternatives. For effective decision making, a person
must be able to forecast the outcome of each option as
well, and based on all these items, determine which
option is the best for that particular situation. Thus,
every decision making process produces a final choice.
The output can be an action or an opinion of choice
(Reason, 1990).
Human performance in decision making has been the
subject of active research from several perspectives. From
a psychological perspective, it is necessary to examine in-
dividual decisions in the context of a set of needs and
preferences an individual has and values the individual
seeks. From a cognitive perspective, the decision making
process must be regarded as a continuous process inte-
grated in the interaction with the environment. From a
normative perspective, the analysis of individual decisions
is concerned with the logic of decision making and ratio-
nality, and the invariant choice it leads to. At another level,
it might be regarded as a problem solving activity which is
terminated when a satisfactory solution is reached.
Therefore, decision making is a reasoning or emotional
process, which can be rational or irrational, and can be
based on explicit assumptions or tacit assumptions
(Kahneman & Tversky, 2000).Theories of decision making
Subjective expected utility (SEU) theory
Consider the example given in Box 1 (Manktelow, 2012):
This example from Millionaire is of a decision about
gamble for money. Subjective expected utility (SEU) theory
is based on the idea that all decisions can be seen in this
light: essentially as gambles, as proposed by Von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944). The SEU approach used expected
value approach by taking into account the probability of
Box 1.
One of the most popular TV programmes worldwide is
WhoWants to be aMillionaire? Suppose a decisionmaker
is faced with a choice at the $8000 question after using
all lifelines: (i) Quit and take $4000 for sure, or (ii) Guess
right and take $8000 (and higher prizes still), or (iii)
Guess wrong and go home with only $1000. In a partic-
ular instance, a contestant faced with this choice
decided to take $4000, and quit. A natural question
arises: Did the contestant do the right thing?
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it. Manktelow (2012) shows that the player in the example
in Box 1 should have gambled. But he did not! Perhaps, he
was just being irrational.
Thus, one problem with the SEU approach is that deci-
sion makers are not always rational, and there are other
factors that might affect the decisions than expected valueBox 2. One of the most famous, indeed infamous, documented pieces of personal decision
making is to be found in Charles Darwin’s journal, where he sets out the pros and cons of
getting married. Darwin’s thoughts are summarised in the table below:
Points against marriage Advantages of marriage
- Freedom to go where one
liked
- Choice of society
- Conversation of clever men
at clubs
- The expense and anxiety of
children
- Not forced to visit relatives
- Children (if it please God)
- Constant companion (and
friend in old age)
- Home, and someone to take
care of house
- It is intolerable to think of
spending one’s whole life-
.working, working
- Better than a dog anyhow!
‘Marry e Marry e Marry e QED’ was his conclusion!
(Side note (Manktelow, 2012): This was in 1838, the year of Darwin’s 29th birthday, and clearly a long time before political
correctness came to the fore. Later that year, he proposed to Emma Wedgwood. To his delight, she accepted, and they were
married the following January. Perhaps his prayer for children was heard: they had ten!)alone. The other problem with the SEU approach is that its
weak ordering principle gives rise to the norm of transi-
tivity of preferences. Thus, in multiple competing decisions
using the SEU approach, if a decision maker prefers A to B,
and also B to C, then he ought to prefer A to C. Do people
always conform to this? Tversky (1969) found that they do
not. Imagine the task of being a university admissions
administrator, who is selecting among applicants. Each
person has been given a score on three dimensions: intel-
ligence, emotional stability, and social skills. As an illus-
tration, the scores of five applicants are shown in Table 1.
One needs to ask which of the five candidates would be
put at the top of the list for admission. Is it candidate E
because of high score in intelligence? Compare this personwith candidate A. Tversky found that most people did
indeed prefer E to A. The interesting part of this experi-
ment was that Tversky used another way of assessing
preferences: people were also asked to compare A with B,
then B with C, C with D and D with E. They tended to prefer
the candidates in that order: A > B, and so on. This should
have meant that A was preferred to E, but the preference
reversed when A and E were compared directly.
Complex decisions: multi-attribute utility theory
(MAUT)
Consider the next example from Manktelow (2012) (refer
Box 2):
In reality, whether or not to get married is a complex
decision. The same can be said for many other major de-
cisions we might be faced with in our lives: whether to go to
university (which one, which course), which job to apply
for, whether to buy a house (which one), whether to relo-
cate (where to), and so on. One obvious source of
complexity is the sheer number of factors that have to beconsidered, along with the relative importance of each. A
formal objective technique has been developed towards
this end, the multi-attribute utility theory, or MAUT
(Keeney, 1992; Keeney & Raiffa, 1976).
As an example of the application of MAUT, consider an
imaginary decision problem of selecting a mobile phone
company’s plan from five plans on offer (Manktelow,
2012). The plans are differentiated on the following at-
tributes: price, free minutes, free SMS, and Internet
surfing. Each attribute has been given an importance
weight by the decision maker. Also, each plan has been
rated on each attribute on a scale from 0 to 100. The
details of the above data are shown in the first five col-
umns of Table 2.
Figure 1 Value function in prospect theory. Source:
Kahneman and Tversky (1979).







A 69 84 75
B 72 78 65
C 75 72 55
D 78 66 45
E 81 60 35
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and weights to arrive at the final aggregate score for each
plan. The aggregate score for each plan is shown in the last
column of the table below. For example, the aggregate
score of 54 for Plan 1 has been calculated as:
80*0.40 þ 20*0.30 þ 50*0.20 þ 60*0.10 Z 54
From Table 2, one can see that there is a clear winner:
Plan 2 gets the highest aggregate score. It is not the
outright best on any aspect, but it scores highest overall as
a result of trading off of each aspect against the others in
terms of their importance.
Can people really be expected to engage in this kind of
process when making choices? Perhaps not. Using a tech-
nique such as MAUT requires a lot of effort and expertise,
which might not be available in real life. Most of the time,
we must simplify the process in some way. These simpli-
fying techniques, or simple decision rules, are known as
heuristics, and will be discussed in detail in a later section.
For now, one such possibility is discussed here which is
directly linked with the MAUT procedure.
This heuristic was introduced by Tversky (1972), and is
called elimination by aspects. One chooses the most
important aspect, finds which options are the best on that
and rejects the rest. If there is no clear winner, one goes on
to the next most important aspect and repeats the process,
and so on, until one is left with the one winning option. In
the earlier example, price was the most important aspect.
Two plans, 1 and 4, come out on top, so we have to look at
the next important criterion e free minutes: Plan 4 scores
higher on that, and so you choose Plan 4. This is certainly
much easier than all the multiplication and addition
required under MAUT, but its disadvantages are also clear.
It leads to the rejection of what was our all-round winner
on the basis of the MAUT analysis. In fact, it led us to the





Plan 1 80 20
Plan 2 70 60
Plan 3 30 80
Plan 4 80 40
Plan 5 50 50important aspect, minutes. The danger, then, is that this
heuristic can lead to lack of consideration of relevant as-
pects and an unsatisfactory conclusion which is objectively
irrational, and not the best on offer.
Prospect theory
Based on the discussion in the earlier two sections, it is
clear that what initially seems like a clear cut case for
relevance of human rationality in decision making calls for
a lot of explanation when faced with the vagaries of actual
human thought and behaviour. The call for such an expla-
nation was answered by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in
the shape of prospect theory. The theory’s impact cannot
be overstated: according to Wu, Zhang and Gonzalez
(2004), Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) paper was the
second most cited in economics in the last quarter of the
20th century. It, and related work, contributed to the
award of the Nobel Prize for economics in 2002.
Prospect theory is basically an adaptation of the SEU
theory. It differs from the classical treatment of utility as
money value in several ways. First, it adopts the principle
of diminishing returns: as wealth increases, each extra
increment of wealth means less and less to us. The second
is regarding its approach to negative utility: we place a
higher negative value on a given level of loss than we place
a positive value on the same level of gain. This implies that
the diminishing utility curve for losses will have a different
shape than for gains: it will be steeper. These two curves
were integrated into a single value function by Kahneman









Executive functions and decision making 207function marks a radical shift from SEU: the point where the
loss and gain curves cross, known as reference point. This is
the state of a person’s current wealth. Any change is either
a gain or a loss with respect to what one already has; once
there has been a change, the reference point shifts to a
new level.
A small thought experiment will illustrate how the
reference point works (refer Box 3).Box 3.
Thought experiment: Suppose a player is playing a
lottery which has the top prize of Rs. 50 lakhs (5
million). If today he discovers that he has a winning
number, naturally he will feel very good about himself.
Now suppose it is the following day, and the lottery
company rings him up and says another 100 people had
those six numbers, so his prize is actually Rs. 50,000.
How would he feel now? It seems likely that he will
feel disappointment e almost as if he had lost Rs.
49.50 lakhs (4.95 million).Psychologically, he has lost
that sum: his reference point shifted from Rs. 50,000
to Rs 49.5 lakhs. It feels like a loss, and it probably
hurts. But objectively, he is still worth Rs. 50,000 more
than he was the previous day, and if he had been the
sole winner of a top prize of Rs. 50,000, he would be
happy now.A novel prediction of prospect theory is the phenomenon
of loss aversion: that people are much more sensitive to
potential losses than potential gains. There is substantial
evidence for the existence of loss aversion. For example,
Kahneman and Tversky (1984) found that most of their
participants refused to bet when offered $20 if a tossed
coin came up heads and a loss of $10 if it came up tails. This
showed clear sensitivity to loss, because the bet provides
an average expected gain of $5 per toss.
Summary
As we have seen, the three theories of decision making
discussed in this section try to incorporate different ele-
ments of realism in decision making, such as, loss aversion,
complexity, uncertainty, individual differences, and so on.
However, in real life, the decision problems are often so
complex that the use of any one theory is usually ruled out.
Instead, several cognitive biases and errors creep in our
decision making when faced with complex real-world
problems. Empirical evidence suggests that in such situa-
tions, the decision makers often use efficient decision rules
known as heuristics. These aspects of decision making are
discussed in the next section.
Cognitive biases, systematic errors, and the
use of heuristics in decision making
According to the multi-attribute utility approach, the deci-
sion maker should identify dimensions relevant to the deci-
sion, decide how to weight these dimensions, obtain thetotal utility (i.e., usefulness) for each option by summing its
weighted dimensional values, and then select the option
with the highest weighted total. It would be clear that the
applicability of this highly rational approach to decision
making might get somewhat limited in more complex and
realistic settings. A more practical approach to complex
decision making owes its origins to Simon (1957).
Human decision making typically possesses bounded ra-
tionality, meaning that one produces reasonable or work-
able solutions to problems by using various short-cut
strategies, or heuristics. Simon (1978) emphasised one
particular heuristic known as satisficing. We can distinguish
between individuals who are satisficers (content with
making reasonable decisions) and those who are maximisers
(perfectionists). Is it preferable to be a satisficer or a
maximiser? This issue was addressed by Schwartz et al.
(2002). They found that there are various advantages
associated with being a satisficer.
Heuristics are rules of thumb or strategies that are likely
to produce a correct solution, but are not guaranteed to do
so. As a consequence, people do not always make wise
decisions because they fail to appreciate the limitations of
heuristics. Indeed, eminent theorists have written that
humans are sometimes systematically irrational (Anderson,
1991), or even predictably irrational (Ariely, 2009). The
strategies that normally guide people toward the correct
decision may sometimes lead them astray. Various biases
can creep into decision making processes. A partial list of
commonly reported cognitive biases is shown in Box 4
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases).
Some commonly reported heuristics are explained in
detail below.
Representativeness heuristic
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1972), we often use a
simple heuristic or rule of thumb known as the represen-
tativeness heuristic. Under this heuristic, the events that
are representative of a class are assigned higher probability
of occurrence. Consider the illustration in Example 1 re-
ported by Kahneman and Tversky (1972):
Example 1. Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and
has four children. He is generally conservative, careful,
and ambitious. He shows no interest in political and social
issues and spends most of his free time on his many hobbies
which include home carpentry, sailing, and mathematical
puzzles.
The participants had to decide the probability that Jack
was an engineer or a lawyer. They were all told the
description had been selected at random from a total of
100 descriptions. Half of the participants were told there
were descriptions of 70 engineers and 30 lawyers, whereas
the other half were told there were descriptions of 70
lawyers and 30 engineers. The participant decided on
average that there was 0.90 probability that Jack was an
engineer, regardless of whether most of the descriptions
were those of engineers or lawyers. Thus, the participant
did not take into account the base-rate information (i.e.,
70e30 split).
Box 4. Commonly reported biases.
- Selective search for evidence (or Confirmation bias in psychology) e Tendency to gather facts that support certain
conclusions but disregarding other facts that support different conclusions.
- Premature termination of search for evidence e Tendency to accept the first alternative that looks like it might
work.
- Inertia e Unwillingness to change thought patterns that were used in the past in the face of new circumstances.
- Selective perception e Tendency to actively screen-out information that is thought to be not important.
- Wishful thinking or optimism bias e Tendency to see things in a positive light, thus distorting perception and thinking
(Chua, Rand-Giovannetti, Schacter, Albert, & Sperling, 2004).
- Choice e Tendency to distort memories of chosen and rejected options to make the chosen options seem more
attractive.
- Recency e Giving more attention to recent information and either ignoring or forgetting more distant information.
The opposite effect is termed Primacy effect.
- Repetition bias e A willingness to believe what has been told most often and by the greatest number of different
sources.
- Anchoring and adjustment e Decisions are unduly influenced by initial information that shapes view of subsequent
information.
- Group think e Peer pressure to conform to the opinions held by the group.
- Source credibility bias e Reject something as a result of bias against the person, organisation, or group to which the
person belongs (i.e., accepting a statement by someone liked).
- Incremental decision making and escalating commitment e Looking at a decision as a small step in a process which
tends to perpetuate a series of similar decisions.
- Role fulfilment e Conforming to the decision making expectations that others have of someone in a particular
position.
- Underestimating uncertainty and the illusion of control e Tendency to underestimate future uncertainty and belief
in more control over events than what exists in reality. We believe we have control to minimise potential problems in
our decisions.
208 S. SwamiThe representativeness heuristic is also involved in the
conjunction fallacy. This is the mistaken belief that the
conjunction or combination of two events (A and B) is more
likely than one of the two events alone. This fallacy is illus-
trated in Example 2 given by Tversky and Kahneman (1983):
Example 2. Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and
very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she
was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and
social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear
demonstrations.
The participants were asked to rank order eight possible
categories in terms of the probability that Linda belonged
to each one. Three of the categories were bank teller,
feminist, and feminist bank teller. Most participants ranked
feminist bank teller as more probable than either bank
teller or feminist. This is incorrect, because all feminist
bank tellers belong to the larger categories of bank tellers
and of feminists! (Eysenck & Keane 2005).
Availability heuristic
The availability heuristic involves estimating the fre-
quencies of events on the basis of how easy or difficult it is
to retrieve relevant information from long-term memory.
This heuristic is illustrated in Example 3 given by Tversky
and Kahneman (1974):Example 3. If a word of three letters or more is sampled at
random from an English text, is it more likely that the word
starts with “r” or has “r” as its third letter?
Most participants argued that a word starting with “r”
was more likely to be picked at random than a word with
“r” as its third letter. There are actually more words with
“r” as its third letter, but words starting with “r” can be
retrieved more easily from memory (i.e., are more avail-
able), and hence, the wrong decision.
Several other heuristics have been discussed in the
literature. These include: anchoring and adjustment,
numerosity, simulation, the framing effect, over-
confidence, planning fallacy, support theory, omission bias,
decision avoidance, status quo bias, and so on. The inter-
ested reader is referred to excellent sources such as Solso
(2012), Matlin (2012), Eysenck and Keane (2005), and
Manktelow (2012).
We now turn our attention to some more practical as-
pects of decision making.
Practical aspects of executive decision making
The issues of cognitive bias, and use of heuristics in busi-
ness decision making have been discussed extensively in
papers such as Teisberg (1993, pp. 1e9), Gary (1998, pp.
3e5), and Sull and Eisenhardt (2012, pp. 3e8). Schoemaker
and Russo (1993) in their “pyramid of decision approaches”
Figure 2 Pyramid of decision approaches. Source:
Schoemaker and Russo (1993).
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making, ranging from intuitive to highly analytical.
Intuition
The first approach, intuition, can sometimes produce
brilliant results. When based on extensive learning from
past experience, it may truly reflect “automated exper-
tise”. However, Schoemaker and Russo (1993) demonstrate
that intuitive approaches may suffer from the problems of
inconsistency (e.g., different decisions on different days),
and distortion (e.g., systematically under or over-
emphasising certain piece of information). One tends to
sometimes overemphasise the most recent information
(recency effect), or the first information received (primacy
effect). Consider the example Executive exercise 1 based
on Schoemaker and Russo (1993):
Executive exercise 1. Sometimes intuition is the only op-
tion available in decision making. Ask the executives in your
organisation the situations under which they would have
predominantly used intuition in managerial decision mak-
ing. In such instances, one should also challenge the deci-
sion maker to articulate the reasoning underlying the
decision.
Rules
The second approach involves rules tomake decisions. Some
rules are specific to industries or occupations; others are
generic. Decisions based on rules are generally more accu-
rate than wholly intuitive ones. Rules are quick and often
clever ways to approximate an optimal response without
having to incur the cost of a detailed analysis. Like intuition,
rules are fast and often easy to apply. However, people do
not always use rules judiciously, and often do not realise
their inherent distortions. Some examples of rule-based
decisions include determining when to change product pri-
ces, replace parts, launch a newproduct, sell a property, and
even hire people. When the environment changes, due to
deregulation, new technologies, or shifts in consumer pref-
erences, it is likely that some of the old rules may become
outdated. In such cases, the rulesmay need to be updated on
a continuous basis. Consider the example Executive exercise
2 based on Schoemaker and Russo (1993):
Executive exercise 2. Ask managers to make a list of the
rules-of-thumb in their industry and company. Ask them to
take a specific rule and think of a situation in which using
that rule would produce a good decision. Ask the managers
to think of a situation in which the rule led to a bad decision
and explain why.
Importance weighting
In the scheme of importance weighting, the first task is to
identify and quantify the factors needed to make a deci-
sion. The second task is to weigh the importance of these
factors relative to one another. The third step is to multiply
the score of each factor by the appropriate weight and addall the weighted scores to come up with an overall score for
a particular option or decision.
Models can be built that measure the relationship of
weighted attributes to actual outcomes. Themodel-building
approach to decision making has been shown to succeed in
an example with security analysts (Schoemaker & Russo
1993). A natural question that arises with the model build-
ing approach is as followse once amodel has been built, why
use the expert? Why not use themodel? This process is called
“bootstrapping,” for obvious reasons: the model is derived
from the expert’s own use of the available criteria, but it
improves decisions based on those criteria. This happens
because the model is not beset with distractions, fatigue,
boredom and all the other factors that make us human. The
model applies the expert’s insights consistently (without
using any additional information).
Use of the model ultimately improves the company’s
bottom-line results, but it may not be easy. First, analysts
and portfolio experts have to be persuaded that their
intuitive judgments might not be totally free of bias. Sec-
ond, these experts need to accept the model that com-
bined their insights as their friend, not their rival. Third,
the experts want the power to override the model in case
its use is clearly inappropriate (as during a stock market
crash). Therefore, it has been suggested that a 50e50
combination of a bootstrap model and top experts is best
(Blattberg & Hoch, 1990; Eliashberg, Swami, Weinberg, &
Wierenga, 2009). However, even bootstrap models have
their limitations. They do not consider how the factors are
linked to ultimate goals and strategies, and they assume
that an increase in a given factor adds value at a constant
rate. Value analysis addresses these issues.
Value analysis
When a decision is truly important and complex, value
analysis conducts a more comprehensive assessment.
Value analysis refines importance weighting techniques by
considering how factors affect broader objectives and
how increases in the rating of a factor add value. Value
analysis goes beyond lists of factors to uncover the true
values of the decision maker. It does this by linking the
factors to key objectives, which results in a “goal
hierarchy”.
Schoemaker and Russo (1993) summarise their discussion
on a pyramid of decision approaches as shown in Fig. 2. The
issue boils down to a subjective tradeoff between effort
and decision quality. The higher the method is on the
Box 5.
Knapsack problem e A hiker has a choice of n objects
to carry on a hiking trip. The weight w and value v of
each object is known. The hiker has a knapsack
(backpack) of limited capacity W in which to carry the
objects. The hiker has to choose a subset of n objects
in such a way that the total value of all the objects
included in the knapsack is maximised, while meeting
the capacity constraint.
210 S. Swamipyramid, the more accurate, complex, and costly it tends
to be. The pyramidal shape shows that higher approaches
are used less frequently than lower ones and for more
important decisions.
Case: complex and realistic decision making
We now illustrate the use of heuristics in complex and
realistic decision making. The problem setting is a hypo-
thetical one as illustrated in Box 5:
A mathematical formulation of the above problem is
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This seemingly simple problem is actually quite complex,
and has been listed in the extant literature as belonging to
the class of computationally hard problems, known as NP-
hard problems. This is, of course, particularly the case when
the problem size (i.e., no. of objects) increases significantly.
The reality, however, is that, in real life we face decision
problems which are quite large-size problems.
As an application of the knapsack problem to reality, an
example is given of supermarket retailing. In the shelf-space
management in supermarkets, each retail shelf has a display
space in which a number of products of different sizes and
potential profitability can be displayed. However, each shelf
has limited display capacity, and not all the products can be
displayed. The objective of the supermarket retail manager
is to choose products for display in such a way that the total
profitability of the store is maximised. The analogy with the
knapsack can readily be appreciated with retail space as
knapsack, products as knapsack objects, shelf space occu-
pied by each product as object weight, and potential prof-
itability of each product as the value of the object. While a
fully optimal solution for a large-size problem is not possible
in a reasonable amount of time even on fast computers,
retail managers have developed fast and effective heuristics
for implementation in supermarkets. A small numerical
example, given below, will illustrate this point with three
objects, and knapsack capacity W Z 3.Object I II III
Value 2 3 4
Weight 2 1 3The following heuristics (and several others) could be
used to solve this problem:
i) Sort the objects in the descending order of value (v).
Continue to include the objects in that order until the
knapsack capacity is fulfilled.
ii) Sort the objects in the descending order of value per
unit weight (v/w). Continue in that order until the
knapsack capacity is fulfilled.
iii) Include the objects in random order.
It is clear that the first two heuristics would perform
better than the third on average. The solution to the first
heuristic is to include Object III, with total value Z 4. The
solution to the second heuristic is to include Objects I and
II, with total valueZ 5. Indeed, the optimal solution to this
problem is to include the Objects I and II. Thus, a decision
rule based on value per unit weight is superior to a rule
based on value alone. In fact, several theorists and prac-
titioners have recommended use of similar rules such as
direct product profitability in the context of retailing
(Hansen, Raut, & Swami, 2010; Kotler, Keller, Koshy, & Jha,
2009). Similar applications have been reported in other
contexts such as web site advertising space, movie
retailing, etc. (Raut, Swami, & Moholkar, 2009).Concluding observations
Unconscious decision making
One must keep in mind that most decisions are made un-
consciously. Nightingale (2007), author of Think Smarte Act
Smart, states that we simply decide without thinking much
about the decision process (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Decision_making). In a controlled environment, such as a
classroom, instructors encourage students to weigh pros and
cons before making a decision. However, in the real world,
many decisions are made unconsciously in our mind. In such
situations with higher time pressure, higher stakes, or
increased ambiguities, experts may well use intuitive deci-
sion making rather than structured approaches.
Multiple criteria
In some situations, the goal of the decision maker might be to
find the best alternative when all the criteria are considered
simultaneously. Solving such problems is the focus of multi-
criteria decision making (MCDM). Such problems are consid-
erablymore complex, althoughmore realistic, than the single
criterion problem (Triantaphyllou, 2000).
The optimists versus the pessimists
Despite some of our astonishing perceptual, memory, and
linguistic capabilities, we humans do not seem to be
especially wise decision makers. We rely too heavily on
decision-making heuristics, and we might be limited by
biases such as framing effects and overconfidence. This is
the admittedly pessimistic view presented by researchers
such as Tversky and Kahneman. In response to this view,
Executive functions and decision making 211however, a group of optimistic decision theorists has
emerged. One of the most prominent of these optimists is
Gerd Gigerenzer (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1993; Gigerenzer &
Horrage, 1995). Gigerenzer avers that people may not be
perfectly rational decision makers, but the research has not
tested them fairly and has not used naturalistic setting.
Specially, they argue that people would perform better if
psychologists eliminated “trick” questions. They also argue
that people perform better when the question is asked in
terms of frequencies, rather than probabilities.
Group decision making
Group decision making (also known as collaborative deci-
sion making) is a situation faced when individuals collec-
tively make a choice from the alternatives before them.
The decisions made by groups are often different from
those made by individuals. Factors that impact other so-
cial group behaviours also affect group decisions. For
example, groups high in cohesion, in combination with
other antecedent conditions (e.g., ideological homoge-
neity and insulation from dissenting opinions) have been
noted to have a negative effect on group decision making
and hence on group effectiveness (Janis, 1972). Consensus
decision-making tries to avoid “winners” and “losers.”
Consensus requires that a majority approve a given course
of action, but that the minority agrees to go along with
the course of action. The Delphi method is a structured
communication technique for groups, originally developed
for collaborative forecasting but has also been used for
policy making.
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